War Plans: United States and Iran

A possible U.S. attack against Iran has been a hot topic in the news for many months now. In some quarters it has become an article of faith that the Bush administration intends to order such an attack before it leaves office. It remains a mystery whether the administration plans an actual attack or whether it is using the threat of attack to try to intimidate Iran -- and thus shape its behavior in Iraq and elsewhere. Unraveling the mystery lies, at least in part, in examining what a U.S. attack would look like, given U.S. goals and resources, as well as in considering the potential Iranian response. Before turning to intentions, it is important to discuss the desired outcomes and capabilities. Unfortunately, those discussions have taken a backseat to speculations about the sheer probability of war.Let's begin with goals. What would the United States hope to achieve by attacking Iran? On the broadest strategic level, the answer is actually quite simple. After 9/11, the United States launched counterstrikes in the Islamic world. The goal was to disrupt the al Qaeda core in order to prevent further attacks against the United States. The counterstrikes also were aimed at preventing the emergence of a follow-on threat from the Islamic world that would replace the threat that had been posed by al Qaeda. The disruption of all Islamic centers of power that have the ability and intent to launch terrorist attacks against the United States is a general goal of U.S. strategy. With the decline of Sunni radicalism, Iran has emerged as an alternative Shiite threat. Hence, under this logic, Iran must be dealt with.Obviously, the greater the disruption of radically anti-American elements in the Islamic world, the better it is for the United States. But there are three problems here. First, the United States has a far more complex relationship with Iran than it does with al Qaeda. Iran supported the U.S. attack against the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as the U.S. invasion of Iraq -- for its own reasons, of course. Second, the grand strategy of the United States might include annihilating Islamic radicalism, but at the end of the day, maintaining the balance of power between Sunnis and Shia and between Arab and non-Arab Muslims is a far more practical approach. Finally, the question of what to do about Iran depends on the military capabilities of the United States in the immediate future. The intentions are shaped by the capabilities. What, therefore, would the U.S. goals be in an attack against Iran? They divide into three (not mutually exclusive) strategies: 1. Eliminating Iran's nuclear program.2. Crippling Iran by hitting its internal infrastructure -- political, industrial and military -- ideally forcing regime change that would favor U.S. interests.3. Using an attack -- or threatening an attack -- to change Iranian behavior in Iraq, Lebanon or other areas of the world.It is important to note the option that is not on the table: invasion by U.S. ground forces, beyond the possible use of small numbers of Special Operations forces. Regardless of the state of Iranian conventional forces after a sustained air attack, the United States simply does not have the numbers of ground troops needed to invade and occupy Iran -- particularly given the geography and topography of the country. Therefore, any U.S. attack would rely on the forces available, namely air and naval forces. The destruction of Iran's nuclear capabilities would be the easiest to achieve, assuming that U.S. intelligence has a clear picture of the infrastructure of that program and that the infrastructure has not been hardened to the point of being invulnerable to conventional attack. Iran, however, learned a great deal from Iraq's Osirak experience and has spread out and hardened its nuclear facilities. Also, given Iran's location and the proximity of U.S. forces and allies, we can assume the United States would not be interested in a massive nuclear attack with the resulting fallout. Moreover, we would argue that, in a world of proliferation, it would not be in the interest of the United States to set a precedent by being the first use to use nuclear weapons since World War II.Therefore, the U.S. option is to carry out precision strikes against Iran's nuclear program using air- and sea-launched munitions. As a threat, this is in an interesting option. As an actual operation, it is less interesting. First, the available evidence is that Iran is years away from achieving a deliverable nuclear weapon. Second, Iran might be more interested in trading its nuclear program for other political benefits -- specifically in Iraq. An attack against the country's nuclear facilities would make Tehran less motivated than before to change its behavior. Furthermore, even if its facilities were destroyed, Iran would retain its capabilities in Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere in the world. Therefore, unless the United States believed there was an imminent threat of the creation of a deliverable nuclear system, the destruction of a long-term program would eliminate the long-term threat, but leave Iran's short-term capabilities intact. Barring imminent deployment, a stand-alone attack against Iran's nuclear capabilities makes little sense. That leaves the second option -- a much broader air and sea campaign against Iran. This would have four potential components:1. Attacks against its economic infrastructure, particularly its refineries.2. Attacks against its military infrastructure.3. Attacks against its political infrastructure, particularly its leadership.4. A blockade and sanctions.Let's begin in reverse order. The United States has the ability to blockade Iran's ports, limiting the importation of oil and refined products, as well as food. It does not have the ability to impose a general land blockade against Iran, which has long land borders, including with Iraq. Because the United States lacks the military capability to seal those borders, goods from around Iran's periphery would continue to flow, including, we emphasize, from Iraq, where U.S. control of transportation systems, particularly in the Shiite south, is limited. In addition, it is unclear whether the United States would be willing to intercept, board and seize ships from third-party countries (Russia, China and a large number of small countries) that are not prepared to participate in sanctions or might not choose to respect an embargo. The United States is stretched thin, and everyone knows it. A blockade could invite deliberate challenges, while enforcement would justify other actions against U.S. interests elsewhere. Any blockade strategy assumes that Iran is internationally isolated, which it is not, that the United States can impose a military blockade on land, which it cannot, and that it can withstand the consequences elsewhere should a third party use U.S. actions to justify counteraction, which is questionable. A blockade could hurt Iran's energy economy, but Iran has been preparing for this for years and can mitigate the effect by extensive smuggling operations. Ultimately, Iran is not likely to crumble unless the United States can maintain and strengthen the blockade process over a matter of many months at the very least. Another option is a decapitation strike against Iran's leadership -- though it is important to recall how this strategy failed in Iraq at the beginning of the 2003 invasion. Decapitation assumes superb intelligence on the location of the leadership at a given time -- and that level of intelligence is hard to come by. Iraq had a much smaller political elite than Iran has, and the United States couldn't nail down its whereabouts. It also is important to remember that Iran has a much deeper and more diverse leadership structure than Iraq had. Iraq's highly centralized system included few significant leaders. Iran is more decentralized and thus has a much larger and deeper leadership cadre. We doubt the United States has the real-time intelligence capability to carry out such a broad decapitation strike. The second option is an assault against the Iranian military. Obviously, the United States has the ability to carry out a very effective assault against the military's technical infrastructure -- air defense, command and control, aircraft, armor and so on. But the Iranian military is primarily an infantry force, designed for internal control and operations in mountainous terrain -- the bulk of Iran's borders. Once combat operations began, the force would disperse and tend to become indistinguishable from the general population. A counterpersonnel operation would rapidly become a counterpopulation operation. Under any circumstances, an attack against a dispersed personnel pool numbering in the high hundreds of thousands would be sortie intensive, to say the least. An air campaign designed to impose high attrition on an infantry force, leaving aside civilian casualties, would require an extremely large number of sorties, in which the use of precision-guided munitions would be of minimal value and the use of area weapons would be at a premium. Given the fog of war and intelligence issues, the ability to evaluate the status of this campaign would be questionable. In our view, the Iranians are prepared to lose their technical infrastructure and devolve command and control to regional and local levels. The collapse of the armed forces -- most of whose senior officers and noncoms fought in the Iran-Iraq war with very flexible command and control -- is unlikely. The force would continue to be able to control the frontiers as well as maintain internal security functions. The United States would rapidly establish command of the air, and destroy noninfantry forces. But even here there is a cautionary note. In Yugoslavia, the United States learned that relatively simple camouflage and deception techniques were quite effective in protecting tactical assets. The Iranians have studied both the Kosovo war and U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have extensive tactical combat experience themselves. A forced collapse from the air of the Iranian infantry capability -- the backbone of Iran's military -- is unlikely.This leaves a direct assault against the Iranian economic infrastructure. Although this is the most promising path, it must be remembered that counterinfrastructure and counterpopulation strategic air operations have been tried extensively. The assumption has been that the economic cost of resistance would drive a wedge between the population and the regime, but there is no precedent in the history of air campaigns for this assumption. Such operations have succeeded in only two instances: Japan and Kosovo. In Japan, counterpopulation operations of massive proportions involving conventional weapons were followed by two atomic strikes. Even in that case, there was no split between regime and population, but a decision by the regime to capitulate. The occupation in Kosovo was not so much because of military success as diplomatic isolation. That isolation is not likely to happen in Iran. In all other cases -- Britain, Germany, Vietnam, Iraq -- air campaigns by themselves did not split the population from the regime or force the regime to change course. In Britain and Vietnam, the campaigns failed completely. In Germany and Iraq (and Kuwait), they succeeded because of follow-on attacks by overwhelming ground forces. The United States could indeed inflict heavy economic hardship, but history suggests that this is more likely to tighten the people's identification with the government -- not the other way around. In most circumstances, air campaigns have solidified the regime's control over the population, allowing it to justify extreme security measures and generating a condition of intense psychological resistance. In no case has a campaign led to an uprising against the regime. Moreover, a meaningful campaign against economic infrastructure would take some 4 million barrels per day off of the global oil market at a time when oil prices already are closing in on $100 a barrel. Such a campaign is more likely to drive a wedge between the American people and the American government than between the Iranians and their government. For an air campaign to work, the attacking power must be prepared to bring in an army on the ground to defeat the army that has been weakened by the air campaign -- a tactic Israel failed to apply last summer in Lebanon. Combined arms operations do work, repeatedly. But the condition of the U.S. Army and Marines does not permit the opening of a new theater of operations in Iran. Most important, even if conditions did permit the use of U.S. ground forces to engage and defeat the Iranian army -- a massive operation simply by the size of the country -- the United States does not have the ability to occupy Iran against a hostile population. The Japanese and German nations were crushed completely over many years before an overwhelming force occupied them. What was present there, but not in Iraq, was overwhelming force. That is not an option for Iran. Finally, consider the Iranian response. Iran does not expect to defeat the U.S. Air Force or Navy, although the use of mine warfare and anti-ship cruise missiles against tankers in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz should not be dismissed. The Iranian solution would be classically asymmetrical. First, they would respond in Iraq, using their assets in the country to further complicate the occupation, as well as to impose as many casualties as possible on the United States. And they would use their forces to increase the difficulty of moving supplies from Kuwait to U.S. forces in central Iraq. They also would try to respond globally using their own forces (the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), as well as Hezbollah and other trained Shiite militant assets, to carry out counterpopulation attacks against U.S. assets around the world, including in the United States.If the goal is to eliminate Iran's nuclear program, we expect the United States would be able to carry out the mission. If, however, the goal is to compel a change in the Iranian regime or Iranian policy, we do not think the United States can succeed with air forces alone. It would need to be prepared for a follow-on invasion by U.S. forces, coming out of both Afghanistan and Iraq. Those forces are not available at this point and would require several years to develop. That the United States could defeat and occupy Iran is certain. Whether the United States has a national interest in devoting the time and the resources to Iran's occupation is unclear. The United States could have defeated North Vietnam with a greater mobilization of forces. However, Washington determined that the defeat of North Vietnam and the defense of Indochina were not worth the level of effort required. Instead, it tried to achieve its ends with the resources it was prepared to devote to the mission. As a result, resources were squandered and the North Vietnamese flag flies over what was Saigon.The danger of war is that politicians and generals, desiring a particular end, fantasize that they can achieve that end with insufficient resources. This lesson is applicable to Iran.

By George Friedman

Iran's Hezbollah Card

As noted by Stratfor CEO George Friedman, news outlets have been rife with speculation about a U.S. attack against Iran, although the frequency and tenor of the leaks have made us question whether the Bush administration intends to order an actual attack or whether the leaks are merely an effort to intimidate Tehran. There is no doubt in our minds, however, that military action is being given at least some consideration, and that U.S. military planners are gathering intelligence and firming up plans to hit a variety of Iranian target sets. For almost as long as we have been hearing about a pending attack against Iran, we have been receiving source reports regarding Iran's plans for retaliation. Such plans would be directed not only against the U.S. forces delivering the attacks or troops on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan but also against broader U.S. interests in the region and globally. Indeed, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned in February that any aggression against his country would be met with reciprocal strikes by Iranian forces inside and outside of Iran. One of the most recent of these reports noted that Hezbollah terrorism mastermind Imad Fayez Mugniyah has been training Shiite militants from Arab Persian Gulf states in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley for possible retaliatory attacks.Such reports are intentional reminders that Iran controls a powerful terrorism card -- and intends to play it should the need arise. Unlike al Qaeda, which has been badly damaged as an organization since 9/11, Hezbollah has never been stronger -- and does pose a strategic threat to the United States. In addition to Hezbollah -- which might be better positioned to conduct attacks in many parts of the world than the Iranian government itself -- Iran's retaliatory plans would include other external surrogates, as well as indigenous Iranian forces such as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which includes its Quds Force and Special Unit of Martyr Seekers. If the United States does attack Iran and the Iranians call upon Hezbollah to take action, the organization can be expected to comply -- though it is known for obscuring its ties to attacks and probably will do the same in the future. There are, however, some operational factors that can be seized upon to spot and help mitigate the threat posed by this dangerous organization. HezbollahThe revolutionaries who overthrew the shah of Iran and established an Islamic republic in the early 1980s sought to export the ideals of their revolution to other Shiite groups in the region. Hezbollah grew out of these efforts. Although it is a Lebanese organization, it has always been closely aligned with Iran and the Iranian IRGC and MOIS, which helped train and organize its members. This relationship is quite visible in the Hezbollah flag, which incorporates the IRGC symbol of the raised fist holding a rifle. Since the early 1980s, the best and brightest Hezbollah fighters have been taken to Iran, where they have received advanced military and intelligence training -- not to mention ideological indoctrination. Iranian weapons and training have allowed Hezbollah to develop into a powerful military force that can not only compete with its rival militias in Lebanon but also stand up to the might of the Israeli armed forces. Iran also has been intimately involved in promoting its loyalists into positions of power within the Hezbollah organization, while Hezbollah has received hundreds of millions of dollars over the years from its Iranian patrons (not to mention the income it receives from Syria and its widespread illegal activities). For all these reasons, Hezbollah remains loyal to Iran and the ideals of the Iranian revolution.In addition to its formidable conventional military threat, Hezbollah has continued to refine its already considerable core competency in militant specialties such as kidnapping, assassination and the construction and employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It was a Hezbollah operation that resulted in the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, an act that precipitated the 2006 conflict, in which Hezbollah employed IEDs very effectively against the Israel Defense Forces. Hezbollah has evolved considerably since the 1980s, when it conducted most of its attacks against U.S. targets. Today, it is a political party that holds seats in the Lebanese parliament and a social services organization that runs hospitals, schools and orphanages. This multiplicity of functions has caused some governments and even the European Union to resist labeling the organization a terrorist group. Hezbollah also is now far larger and more geographically widespread than ever before, while its global array of members and supporters is intertwined with sophisticated finance/logistics and intelligence networks. Also, thanks to Iran, Hezbollah has far more -- and better trained -- operational cadre than al Qaeda ever had. The Hezbollah cadre also is experienced in skullduggery, having conducted scores of transnational terrorist operations before al Qaeda was even formed. In fact, al Qaeda has borrowed many pages from the Hezbollah operational playbook, and there are persistent rumors that Hezbollah leaders such as Mugniyah even helped teach al Qaeda cadre how to construct large vehicle bombs at al Qaeda's training facilities in Sudan. Also, and this is not trivial, Hezbollah operatives can receive assistance in the form of intelligence, or even materials, from MOIS' worldwide network -- as past attacks demonstrate. (The inviolability of the diplomatic pouch is a wonderful thing when you are planning a terrorist strike.) Iranian state sponsorship provides Hezbollah with a support network that al Qaeda can only dream of. In Hezbollah, size, professionalism, experience and state-sponsorship are combined to create a dangerous organization. In fact, because of these factors, Hezbollah poses a larger potential threat to the United States than does al Qaeda -- especially an al Qaeda crippled by U.S. actions since 9/11. Hezbollah OperationsAlthough Hezbollah operatives are highly skilled in the tradecraft of terrorism, those planning attacks are not invulnerable to detection -- most significantly during the preoperational surveillance stage. Like the military commands of many countries, Hezbollah uses a contingency, or "off-the-shelf," model of operational planning, meaning that several hypothetical targets are selected and attack plans for each are developed in advance. This gives the Hezbollah leadership several plans to choose from when considering and authorizing an attack -- and it allows the group to hit hard and fast once a decision has been made to strike. Although law enforcement and security officials most likely are aware of some of the preselected targets -- due to countersurveillance operations -- an off-the-shelf operation makes it difficult for authorities to determine which target will actually be hit. Moreover, the potential time lapse between the initial surveillance and any attack could allow any alerts or increased security caused by the surveillance to subside by the time an attack takes place. Even though Hezbollah tends to use off-the-shelf plans, the need for countersurveillance remains strong. When an order to execute a mission is given, pre-existing plans must be dusted off, meaning the preoperational surveillance must be updated before an actual strike can take place to ensure that no important changes have occurred at the target. Although this second round of surveillance often is less comprehensive than the initial surveillance, these secondary efforts still require cell members to expose themselves -- and thus become vulnerable to detection. Although it has been many years since Hezbollah conducted an overseas attack, operatives linked to Hezbollah (or the Iranian MOIS/IRGC) have been observed many times conducting surveillance of potential targets inside and outside the United States -- and several operatives have been arrested as a result. In some of these cases, the operatives could have been pinging the system, or even having some fun by messing with the Americans, but Hezbollah's use of off-the-shelf planning is one reason so many detected surveillance efforts have not been followed by an attack. Judging from Hezbollah's past response to specific events, it seems to take the group four to five weeks to launch an off-the-shelf attack, as was shown in such attacks as the 1992 bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and the 1994 Buenos Aires and London bombings. This time allows planners to touch up the plan, surveil targets again, obtain explosives, construct their devices and bring in an attack team.Because of this, should the United States strike Iran and Hezbollah be asked to conduct retaliatory strikes overseas, there would be a lag of some four to five weeks before any such attacks would occur. Therefore, countersurveillance efforts should be increased on potential targets during this lag time, especially on targets where Hezbollah or Iranian officers are known to have conducted earlier surveillance.Although the Iranian MOIS and IRGC components seem to prefer assassinations and small-arms attacks, Hezbollah operatives tend to conduct more spectacular attacks, such as vehicle bombings and hijackings. Hezbollah also has a history of claiming such attacks using pseudonyms, such as Islamic Jihad Organization or Organization for the Oppressed of the Earth, in order to sow confusion and hide the group's hand. Hezbollah has an expansive worldwide presence, though it has had much greater operational success staging attacks in the developing world -- where weapons and materiel are readily available -- than in more industrialized and secure regions such as Europe. The size difference between the vehicle-borne bombs employed in 1994 in Buenos Aires (where Hezbollah was able to purchase explosives commercially) and the smaller device used in London (where explosives were difficult to obtain) was quite dramatic -- as were the results. Hezbollah would have strong motives (pleasing its Iranian masters, for one) to conduct an attack inside the United States rather than in the developing world -- even though such an attack might be more limited. In practical terms, however, it might consider how the American response to 9/11 affected al Qaeda and choose not to go down that road. Instead, it could attack Americans abroad, as it has done many times in the past without arousing much U.S. retribution. Hezbollah, however, has much clearer vulnerabilities than al Qaeda. For example, its training camps and political and social components constitute recognizable infrastructure in Lebanon. While some of that infrastructure is deliberately placed in Lebanese civilian concentrations, a good deal of it, particularly the facilities in the Bekaa Valley, can be attacked without major concern for civilian life. Another consideration for Hezbollah is that the group also maintains close ties to the Syrian regime, and its Syrian handlers do not want to end up in the U.S. crosshairs. Should Hezbollah strike, therefore, it would do so with its characteristically hidden hand.

By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart

Iraq: Positive Signs

The latest reports concerning the war in Iraq suggest the situation is looking up for the United States. First, U.S. military and Iraqi civilian casualties continue to fall. Second, there are confirmed reports that Sunni insurgents controlled by local leaders have turned on al Qaeda militants, particularly those from outside the country. Third, the head of U.S. Central Command, in an interview with the Financial Times, implied that an attack against Iran is a distant possibility.It is tempting to say the United States has turned the corner on the war. The temptation might not be misplaced, but after many disappointments since 2003, it is prudent to be cautious in declaring turning points -- and it is equally prudent not to confuse a turning point with a victory. That said, given expectations that the United States would be unable to limit violence in Iraq, and that Sunni insurgents would remain implacable -- not to mention the broad expectation of a U.S. attack against Iran -- these three points indicate a reversal -- and must be taken seriously. The most startling point is the decline in casualties, and particularly the apparent decline in sectarian violence. Explaining this is difficult. It could simply be the result of the more efficient use of U.S. troops in suppressing the insurgency and controlling the Shiite militias. If that were the only explanation, however, it would be troubling. Standard guerrilla warfare doctrine holds that during periods of intense enemy counterinsurgency operations, guerrillas should cease fighting, hide weapons and equipment and blend into the civilian population. Only after the enemy shifts its area of operations or reduces operational tempo should the guerrillas resume combat operations. Under no circumstances should insurgents attempt to fight a surge. Therefore, if we were considering U.S. military operations alone, few conclusions could be drawn until after the operations shifted or slowed. In addition, in a country of 25 million, the expectation that some 167,000 troops -- many of them not directly involved in combat -- could break the back of an entrenched insurgency is optimistic. The numbers simply don't work, particularly when Shiite militias are added to the equation. Therefore, if viewed simply in terms of military operations, the decline in casualties would not validate a shift in the war until much later, and our expectation is that the insurgency would resume prior levels of activity over time.What makes the situation more hopeful for the United States is the clear decline in civilian casualties. Most of those were caused not by U.S. combat operations but by sectarian conflict, particularly between Sunnis and Shia. Part of the decline can be explained by U.S. operations, but when we look at the scope and intensity of sectarian fighting, it is difficult to give U.S. operations full credit. A more likely explanation is political, a decision on the part of the various sectarian organizations to stop operations not only against the Americans but also against each other.There were two wars going on in Iraq. One was against the United States. The more important war, from the Iraqi point of view, was the Sunni-Shiite struggle to determine who would control Iraq's future. Part of this struggle, particularly on the Shiite side, was intrasectarian violence. All of it was political and, in a real sense, it was life and death. It involved the control of neighborhoods, of ministries, of the police force and so on. It was a struggle over the shape of everyday life. If either side simply abandoned the struggle, it would leave a vacuum for the other. U.S. operations or not, that civil war could not be suspended. To a significant extent, however, it has been suspended. That means that some political decisions were made, at least on the local level and likely at higher levels as well, as several U.S. authorities have implied recently. Civilian casualties from the civil war would not have dropped as much as they have without some sort of political decisions to restrain forces, and those decisions could not be made unilaterally or simply in response to U.S. military pressure. It required a set of at least temporary political arrangements. And that, in many ways, is more promising than simply a decline because of U.S. combat operations. The political arrangements open the door to the possibility that the decline in casualties is likely to be longer lasting. This brings us to the second point, the attacks by the Sunnis against the jihadists. Immediately after the invasion in 2003, the United States essentially attempted to strip the Sunnis -- the foundation of Saddam Hussein's strength -- of their power. The U.S. de-Baathification laws had the effect of eliminating the Sunni community's participation in the future of Iraq. Viewing the Shia -- the victims of Hussein's rule -- as likely interested not only in dominating Iraq but also in retribution against the Sunnis, the Sunni leadership, particularly at the local level, supported and instigated an insurgency against U.S. forces. The political purpose of the insurgency was to force the United States to shift its pro-Shiite policy and include the Sunnis, from religious to Baathist, in the regime. Given the insurgency's political purpose, the power of U.S. forces and the well-organized Shiite militias, the Iraqi Sunnis were prepared to form alliances wherever they could find them. A leading source of support for the Iraqi Sunnis came from outside Iraq, among the Sunni jihadist fighters who organized themselves under the banner of al Qaeda and, weapons in hand, infiltrated the country from outside, particular through Syria. Nevertheless, there was underlying tension between the local Sunnis and the jihadists. The Iraqi Sunnis were part of the local power structure, many having been involved in the essentially secular Baath Party, and others, more religious, having remained outside the regime but ruled by traditional tribal systems. The foreign jihadists were revolutionaries not only in the sense that they were prepared to fight the Americans but also in that they wanted to revolutionize -- radically Islamize -- the local Sunni community. By extension, they wanted to supplant the local leadership with their own by supporting and elevating new local leaders dependent for their survival on al Qaeda power. For an extended period of time, the United States saw the Sunni insurgency as consisting of a single fabric. The local insurgents and the jihadists were viewed as the same, and the adopted name of the jihadists, al Qaeda, caused the Americans to see them as the primary enemy. Over time, and particularly since the death of al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the United States has adopted a more nuanced view of the Sunni insurgency, drawing a distinction between the largely native Iraqi insurgents and the largely foreign jihadists. Once this occurred and the United States began to make overtures to the native Iraqi insurgents, the underlying tensions between the foreign jihadists and the Iraqi insurgents emerged. The Sunnis, over time, came to see the jihadists as a greater danger to them than the Americans, and by the time U.S. President George W. Bush last visited Iraq, several Sunni leaders were prepared to be seen publicly with him. The growing animosities eventually turned into active warfare between the two factions, with al Qaeda being outnumbered and outgunned and the natives enjoying all of the perks of having the home-court advantage.From the U.S. point of view, splitting the Sunni insurgency politically and militarily was important not only for the obvious reasons but also for influencing the Shia. From a Shiite point of view -- and now let's introduce Iran, the primary external backer of Iraq's Shiites -- the worst-case scenario would be the re-establishment of a predominantly Sunni government in Baghdad backed by the U.S. military. The political accommodation between the United States and the Iraqi Sunnis represented a direct threat to the Shia.It is important to recall that Hussein and his Baathist predecessors -- all Sunnis leading a predominantly Sunni government -- were able to dominate the more numerous Shia for decades. The reason was that the Shia were highly fragmented politically, more so than the Sunnis. This historic factionalization made the Shia much weaker than their numbers would have indicated. It was no accident that the Sunnis dominated the Shia. And the Shia remained fragmented. While the Sunnis were fighting an external force, the Shia were fighting both the Sunnis and one another. Given those circumstances, it was not inconceivable that the United States would try, and perhaps succeed, to re-establish the status quo ante of a united Iraq under a Sunni government -- backed by U.S. power until Iraq could regenerate its own force. Of course, that represented a reversal of the original U.S. goal of establishing a Shiite regime.For Iran, this was an intolerable outcome because it would again raise the possibility of an Iran-Iraq war -- in which Iran might take another million casualties. The Iranian response was to use its influence among the competing Shiite militias to attack the Sunnis and to inflict casualties on American troops, hoping to force a withdrawal. Paradoxically, while the jihadists are the Iranians' foe, they were useful to Tehran because the more they attacked the Shia -- and the more the Shia retaliated -- the more the Sunnis and al Qaeda aligned -- which kept the United States and the Sunnis apart. Iran, in other words, wanted a united Sunni-jihadist movement because it would wreck the emerging political arrangements. In addition, when the Iranians realized that the Democrats in the U.S. Congress were not going to force a U.S. withdrawal, their calculations about the future changed.Caught between al Qaeda and the militias, the Sunnis were under intense pressure. The United States responded by conducting operations against the jihadists -- trying to limit engagements with Iraqi Sunni insurgents -- and most important, against Shiite militias. The goal was to hold the Sunnis in the emerging political matrix while damaging the militias that were engaging the Sunnis. The United States was trying increase the cost to the Shia of adhering to the Iranian strategy.At the same time, the United States sought to intimidate the Iranians by raising, and trying to make very real, the possibility that the United States would attack them as well. As we have argued, the U.S. military options are limited, so an attack would make little military sense. The Iranians, however, could not be certain that the United States was being rational about the whole thing, which was pretty much what the United States wanted. The United States wanted the Shia in Iraq to see the various costs of following the Iranian line -- including creating a Sunni-dominated government -- while convincing the Iranians that they were in grave danger of American military action.In this context, we find the third point particularly interesting. Adm. William Fallon's interview with the Financial Times -- in which he went out of its way to downplay the American military threat to Iran -- was not given by accident. Fallon does not agree to interviews without clearance. The United States was using the interview to telegraph to Iran that it should not have undue fear of an American attack. The United States can easily turn up the heat again psychologically, though for the moment it has chosen to lower it. By doing so, we assume Washington is sending two messages to Iran. First, it is acknowledging that creating a predominantly Sunni government is not its first choice. Also, it is rewarding Iran for the decline in violence by the Shiite militias, which undoubtedly required Tehran to shift its orders to its covert operatives in Iraq.The important question is whether we are seeing a turning point in Iraq. The answer is that it appears so, but not primarily because of the effectiveness of U.S. military operations. Rather, it is the result of U.S. military operations coupled with a much more complex and sophisticated approach to Iraq. To be more precise, a series of political initiatives that the United States had undertaken over the past two years in fits and starts has been united into a single orchestrated effort. The result of these efforts was a series of political decisions on the part of various Iraqi parties not only to reduce attacks against U.S. troops but also to bring the civil war under control. A few months ago, we laid out four scenarios for Iraq, including the possibility that that United States would maintain troops there indefinitely. At the time, we argued against this idea on the assumption that what had not worked previously would not work in the future. Instead, we argued that resisting Iranian power required that efforts to create security be stopped and troops moved to blocking positions along the Saudi border. We had not calculated that the United States would now supplement combat operations with a highly sophisticated and nuanced political offensive. Therefore, we were wrong in underestimating the effectiveness of the scenario. That said, a turning point is not the same as victory, and the turning point could turn into a failure. The key weaknesses are the fragmented Shia and the forces and decisions that might emerge there, underwritten by Iran. Everything could be wrecked should Iran choose to take the necessary risks. For the moment, however, the Iranians seem to be exercising caution, and the Shia are responding by reducing violence. If that trend continues, then this really could be a turning point. Of course, any outcome that depends on the Shia and Iranians doing what the United States hopes they will do is fragile. Iran in particular has little interest in giving the United States a graceful solution unless it is well compensated for it. On the other hand, for the moment, Tehran is cooperating. This could simply be another instance of Iran holding off before disappointing the United States, or it could mean it has reason to believe it will be well compensated. Revealing that compensation -- if it is coming -- is the next turn of the wheel.

By George Friedman

The Hariri Assassination: Possible Beneficiaries and its links with the current political impasse in Lebanon.

Rafiq Hariri, Lebanon’s five-time prime minister was assassinated on February 14, 2005. Hariri had just left the Lebanese parliament accompanied by the minister of economy Bassil Fleihan. Everything was normal that day, a typical sunny day in downtown Beirut. Everything seemed calm until 12:55 pm when an explosion hit Beirut’s central district. Never before, had an explosion that big gone off in Beirut. The capital was shaken and torn into pieces. Mass hysteria spread among the Lebanese as everyone knew in one way or another, that an explosion that big could only be a terrorist attack that would aim at silencing the Lebanese hope, the Lebanese dream, the Lebanese spirit; one that would take the life of Rafiq Hariri. Until today, more than two years after the assassination, it is still not clear who was behind this attack. The U.N investigation is still ongoing but no definite answer has been reached. People speculate, have doubts, but nobody has a clear answer. In this paper I will start by giving you a brief background of who Hariri was, why he was venerated by many Lebanese and who would actually benefit from his assassination and end up linking events to explain the current Lebanese political impasse.
In 2003, Forbes magazine estimated Hariri’s fortune at $3.8 billion and listed him in its Forbes 100 richest people in the world. Hariri, born in the Lebanese town of Sidon, was raised by a modest family of farmers. He pursued his education in Lebanon and then immigrated to Saudi Arabia, where he made all of his fortune with the help of the Saudi Royal family. Hariri returned to Lebanon in 1990 and started arranging plans to reconstruct downtown Beirut. Hariri was aware that any role in Lebanese politics would have to be approved by the Syrians, and so he did. Hariri was elected Prime Minister in 1992 and restructured the Lebanese economy. Hariri’s main goals were to reconstruct the Lebanese capital and give it back its beauty, unfortunately not everyone agreed with his plans. Hariri had become the most powerful Sunni figure Lebanon had ever known. His contacts reached all four corners of the world orchestrating treaties with the Americans, the French, and the Arabs. Hariri served as Lebanon’s prime minister from 1992 to 1998 then again from 2000 until late 2004. His ever growing grandeur started worrying various actors, and when some saw an opportunity to eliminate him, others saw his assassination’s consequences as a chance to destabilize the country. One can say that his assassination presented various benefits for many actors. In that sense, it is foolish to think that one country could manipulate such an attack, instead this attack must have been orchestrated months ahead, with the coordination of various intelligence services, ranging from the Mossad to the Syrian Intelligence passing by Lebanon’s most complex and well trained party; Hezbollah. The elimination of Hariri would have benefited all three blocs. Behind closed doors Hariri was blunt about the presence of an armed militia in Lebanon. Although he maintained political alliances with Hezbollah, Hariri never supported their military presence. His ever growing popularity presented concerns to Hezbollah as he was slowly seeking their military dismantlement. As for the Syrian presence in Lebanon, Hariri had lobbied among the whole world to pass U.N resolution 1559 that consists of ending Syria’s control over Lebanese politics. From Syria’s side, eliminating a prominent political figure in Lebanon isn’t anything out of the ordinary. Therefore eliminating Hariri would guarantee the Syrians total control over the Lebanese political and economical apparatus. Lastly, the Mossad saw the assassination as an opening to destabilize the country. And an unstable Lebanon, with the help of Western Countries would be westernized to the point that each Lebanese would reject the presence of Hezbollah. Such a scenario is quite an achievement for the Israelis; as their most feared enemy would be taken care of as a consequence of internal problems. Therefore, the role of the Mossad was merely a passive one. The Mossad had to turn a blind eye to what was going to happen, hoping that one of the assassination’s consequences would lead to the weakening of Hezbollah; and with a quick military offensive, Hezbollah would be completely eliminated. Unfortunately both the Syrians and Hezbollah miscalculated the consequences of such an earthquake. What they didn’t take into consideration was the average Lebanese reaction. Previous assassinations executed by the Syrians created a turmoil that lasted a few weeks and slowly faded away. However this one would remind the Lebanese of their 15 year civil war that torn the city apart and brought it back to the Stone Age, and none of them are ready to live these moments again. Hezbollah’s miscalculations lied by overestimating the trust they thought each Lebanese had towards them. Hezbollah had to find out that if it were up to the Lebanese, their existence would be limited to a political party and not an armed militia. As for the Israelis, they had miscalculated the degree of patriotism that the Lebanese had. And if faced by an outside force, whatever the consequences might be, they would support a fellow Lebanese than an enemy that ravaged their country during its civil war. The loyalty of the Lebanese intelligence services at the time of the assassination lied in the hands of the Syrians. The Syrians had appointed key political figures to head the Lebanese intelligence apparatus. Among the chosen ones were Jamil al Sayyed, Mustapha Hamdan, Ali Al-Hajj and Raymond Azar. The four generals were arrested by Lebanese authorities after having witnesses link them to the murder scene. It is believed that Jamil al Sayyed contributed to setting up the assassination plot along with Syrian Officials comprising of Ghazi Kenaan, Rustom Ghazali and Asef Shawkat. As for Mustapha Hamdan, the UN investigation team uncovered evidence linking his involvement after an eye witness testified that Hamdan had told him “We are going to send him on a trip, bye, bye Hariri” (Mehlis, 2005). It is also believed that Mustapha Hamdan had tampered with key evidence that were present at the crime scene, the very same day of the assassination. Hamdan had ordered a bulldozer to cover up the crime scene. Ali Al-Hajj, who once was appointed by the Syrians to head the personal security of Hariri, is suspected of knowing beforehand of the assassination. He was caught by Hariri spying on him for the Syrians and was later fired. In November 2004, Al-Hajj ordered the state security detail around Rafiq Hariri to be reduced from forty personal guards to eight. As for Raymond Azar, he was forwarded on a daily basis wiretapping recordings of Hariri’s telephone calls. He is suspected of having funded and facilitated the various tasks that led to the assassination.
A few days before the assassination, Hariri met with Walid Jumblat, an outspoken critic of Syria’s control over Lebanon. Hariri and Jumblat were political allies and had parallel political goals. During that meeting, Hariri asked Jumblat to leave the country, as he was concerned for his safety. Jumblat neglected Hariri’s concerns and insisted staying in Lebanon no matter what the consequences might be. Various intelligence reports spread around before the assassination, one of which pushed the French president Jacques Chirac to warn Hariri of an attack that was either aimed at the French Ambassador in Lebanon or at Hariri himself. Chirac stressed on the authenticity of the reports. Unfortunately, Hariri over-estimated his security apparatus and didn’t know that a charge of at lest 1000Kg would explode next to his convoy. The U.N has launched its investigation into the assassination ever since the Lebanese government had asked for its help. However the invitation for U.N assistance in solving the crime was far from unanimous and divided the country in two camps; the Opposition led by Hezbollah and his ally General Michel Aoun (Christian Maronite) on one side and on the other, the current government led by Prime Minister Fouad Saniora and various prominent political figures like Samir Geagea (Christian Maronite) and Walid Jumblat (Druze). The current standoff between both parties is because of each party’s position toward the establishment of the International Tribunal. The opposition suspects the U.N of using the international tribunal to declare already made verdicts that will undoubtedly shake the current Lebanese political scene by pointing at Hezbollah. The opposition has its own doubts about the tribunal, stating that this tribunal has been set up to disarm Hezbollah and restructure the current Lebanese political scene by giving unconditional power to the current government. Moreover the opposition is concerned by the fact that the tribunal never examined the possibility of the Mossad being behind such an attack. Their argument clearly states that Israel would be the most beneficial from a weak neighbor than having a united Lebanon. On the other hand, the current government blames the opposition of covering up crucial evidence and backing the Syrians while they are the primary suspects in the murder. Throughout this crisis Hezbollah has been defending Syria and its Lebanese allies more than ever and blaming the U.S government of politicizing the tribunal. Since the beginning of this standoff 4 ministers have resigned from the democratically elect government and the opposition has been demanding the current government’s resignation.
There is no doubt, that the Hariri assassination constituted one of the most technologically advanced assassinations in Middle Eastern history. Thus raising doubts among suspicious Lebanese on who might actually be responsible for this attack. If in fact the attack was orchestrated by Syrian intelligence with the help of Hezbollah, one should be worried about what could lie ahead. Organizing such an attack demands complex resources and a well maintained intelligence apparatus thus worrying the Israelis and plunging the Middle East in a crisis between Hezbollah, Iran and Syria on one side and the Israelis on the other. Another possibility is that it is actually the Mossad that carried out the assassination to try and shakeup the Lebanese political scene by weakening and framing Hezbollah. This could lead to a popular Lebanese uprising against this party. In both cases one thing is surely the same, the main victims of this attack are no other that the average Lebanese, suffering from crippling economy and a political standoff between two political parties that might lead the country to its second civil war.

Important Facts to Note

We all agree that the political climate has been deteriorating in Lebanon. I'm six thousand miles away and echoes are pretty bad from my side of the world. Everything seems possible at this point, whether it's breaking news from private intelligence agencies to random word of mouth, all point out to major changes on the political scene. This post is a brief one as i will be only stating the major facts that one should be aware of.

• The Iranian/Syrian meet didn't go as expected. Apparently the Iranians have kept the Syrians in the dark on a deal that they made with the Saudis. Although the press statement both countries (Iran & Syria) released at the end of their meet seemed optimistic, i am pretty sure that their honeymoon is coming to an end.
• The Iranians and Saudis made an "under the table" deal concerning the Lebanese situation. Terms are still ambiguous but i can tell you one thing: Signing a deal with the Saudis means abiding by U.S terms and conditions.
• Iran will agree on talks concerning its nuclear ambitions.
• The Saudis got the Palestinians to avoid an all out civil war with the "Mecca Agreement." But what is most important to note is that the Saudis are working on a deal with "Khaled Mashal" (Hamas' #1) without going through the Syrians. And as one might expect, the Syrians aren't tolerating it that much.
• Syria is cornered and has started using its back channels to work a deal with the U.S government over Iraq. Some intelligence analysts point out at agreements through the Swiss embassy, some other analysts point out at direct one on one talks.

What is important to note is that all of this happened within a few weeks, which on the political scene is lightning speed.

So how will this get translated on the Lebanese political scene:

Syria isn't dumb. And while it seeks a deal with the U.S government it is still keeping its hands on Lebanon and will not let go until she gets the last word.

One of the most feared politicians in Lebanon is "Nabih Berri." Not because he is head of the Amal movement, but because throughout his years he is the ONLY politician that knew how to strike back politically. Moreover whenever Berri talks everyone, whether it's the opposition or the current government, listens. Unfortunately he lies in the Syrian Camp and is Syria's last card, and the opposition's last hope. But make no mistake about it, if Berri goes on with his scheduled press conference and accuses key political figures, I am afraid the situation might get out of hand.

If Ignorance was bliss, Tunnel vision would actually be…well…Orgasmic!

“First I want to thank whoever read my last post, and would like to thank whoever is taking the time in reading this. I also want to thank all of you who replied to my e-mail, but would suggest that you leave your comments on the post itself so we could actually engage in a debate. Try leaving polite comments when you do, respecting each other’s points of view.”

Ignorance: Lack of knowledge, education, or awareness.*

Tunnel vision: Extreme narrowness of viewpoint.*

Groupthink: A pattern of thought characterized by self-deception, forced manufacture of consent, and conformity to group values and ethics.*

*Please note that these definitions are taken from the Merriam-Webster online dictionary.

First I want to start by asking all of my readers (especially the educated ones) to try and read this with a level of open mindedness. And stop being victims of the propagandas that are launched at you by your leaders (Whether it’s a 14th of March propaganda or of an 8th of March propaganda, I am not excluding any party here).
Below you will find the List of questions I will be discussing in this post. If I didn’t answer all of the questions you e-mailed me please make sure to note that in the comments section, so that I will address it in my next post.

1. Why is the U.S supporting Lebanon?
2. Why is Syria interested in Lebanon?
3. Why will the U.S not give in to Syria’s demands?
4. Why a Lebanese civil war benefits Syria and not Israel?
5. Why is Iran a major player in this situation?
6. Why does Syria have a say in Iran’s decision?
7. What is the outcome of all of this chaos?
8. Where is March 8th (Especially Michel Aoun) going wrong?
9. Where is March 14th going wrong?
10. What should WE (The Lebanese youths) do?



1. Why is the U.S supporting Lebanon?
I must admit. This is quite hard to grasp at first. But it is true.
The U.S has proven to the world that it has done a bad job, but I mean BAD job in handling the Iraq war. Since then, it has been trying to prove that even though things might not always go as planned, it is going to support any form of democracy in the Middle East. Considering the close ties that Hariri had built throughout his years with the western world, the U.S saw itself backing up his government. But what’s important to note in this situation is that the U.S isn’t alone in this. The government is actually backed up by the all of the western powers. After the 2005 assassination of Hariri, somebody had to contain the situation before it went out of hand. Divisions in the country at that point were obvious, and if the situation wouldn’t have been contained properly, chaos would have reigned in the Middle East. Mass demonstrations took over the country demanding the pullout of the Syrians, and if it weren’t for U.S pressures, Syria would have never pulled out. Since then, the world’s hegemon has been supporting the Lebanese.


2. Why is Syria interested in Lebanon?
Well if you don’t already know the answer to this question you’re seriously impaired. But lucky you, I’m here to lay out the main reasons.
Throughout its occupation, Syria has dug its roots in the Lebanese economic and political apparatus.
Economic motive:
Workers – Over a million Syrian workers were present during the Syrian occupation (2003). These workers transfer a total of 3 Billion dollars in hard currency back to their families in Syria each year.
Water Supply – The most prominent example is the control of three quarters of the nahr el 3assi to irrigate Syrian agriculture.
Export – Syria’s dairy and agricultural products, its poultry and most importantly its cotton.
Illegal trade – Syria’s elite controls this turf. Illegal trade includes import of all luxury products with emphasis on stolen luxury cars, control over the electrical industry and the Casino du Liban.
Money Laundering – This territory is the most complex one since it is interconnected with the Lebanese Banking System. Syria’s elite deposits its money in Lebanese accounts and earn up to 30% interest a year.

Political motive:
Arabism – Syria would much rather have control over Lebanon, spreading its socialist ideologies than have a democratic Lebanon where people are mostly westernized.
Israeli confrontation – Syria faced painful consequences with Israel throughout history. Therefore instead of getting its hands dirty again, it would have someone do it for her instead.
Military – Military control over Lebanese territory insures a safety-net for any mishaps with the Israelis.
Foreign policy – Control over Lebanese foreign policy gives Syria power over any decisions taken in the region ranging from oil imports to talks with western powers.


3. Why will the U.S not give in to Syria’s demands?
Throughout history, it has been known that the U.S handed Lebanon in to the Syrians on a Silver plate. However the Syrian / U.S honeymoon never lasted long. Shortly after handing in Lebanon to the Syrians, Syria started usurping its power over Lebanese institutions. At that time, the U.S had its hands full dealing with the fist Iraqi invasion and trying to control its interests in the region. However throughout its occupation of Lebanon, the Syrians engaged in diplomatic relations through the Lebanese government with the U.S executing their orders to keep them at ease. However, Syria’s support for Hezbollah never pleased the U.S and basically led to today’s support for the current government. All reports issued by government agencies and the Iraq study group reject any return of Syrian occupation over Lebanon, for the simple reason that the U.S will not tolerate any support for Hezbollah. And want to get them unarmed as soon as possible.


4. Why a Lebanese Civil war benefits Syria and not Israel?
I agree with all of you who think that the July 2006 war was a total and complete failure for the Israelis. However what we don’t agree on is that if the Israelis really wanted to disarm Hezbollah they would have done so without hesitation. But what kept them from eradicating them is the following:
Media Coverage – This war received more attention throughout the world than any other war has ever received and this includes both Iraqi invasions.
Lebanese Government – The current government plaid the biggest war in stopping the aggressions. In fact, if it weren’t for the diplomatic ties that Hariri had built throughout his reigning years, Lebanon would have been brought back to the Stone Age. The government used its ties with Saudi Arabia to negotiate with the U.S over a quick cessation of Israeli hostilities.

Having said that, we now understand why the Israelis are facing trouble within their government since the objectives set were never achieved.
Moreover it is important to note that if a Lebanese civil war takes place, it is unquestionable that the sole winner would be Hezbollah. Thus completely undermining Israeli plans for the region. In face the sole beneficiary of a Lebanese civil war would be the Syrians, since the reason they entered the first time was a civil war, this would give them an easy way in. All they would have to do is promise the U.S that they will contain the situation and stop the chaos.

5. Why is Iran a major player is this situation?
After pursuing its nuclear program, the Iranian regime was completely isolated by all western powers. Its isolation cut its international aid. But what is important to note in the Iranian case is that its closest ally, North Korea, has agreed to stop its nuclear program in exchange of foreign aid. There is no doubt that Iran will actually follow its ally’s footsteps; however until then it is trying to use whatever influence it still has in the current situation to negotiate a better deal with western powers. Its influence includes the price of Hezbollah’s disarmament.

6. Why does Syria have a say in Iran’s decision?
Syrian and Iranian ties are closer than ever. Since both states are isolated by the rest of the western world, they will work together for each other’s best interest. The most important role that Syria plays when it come to Iranian negotiations is that it is Syria and not Iran that holds the key to Iraqi stability. And with the latest terrorist incursions that Iraq has been witnessing, Syria holds a good card in hand.
Another major point to note is that the Syrians are masters at work whenever it comes to organized crime. Therefore, by destabilizing the Lebanese scene it will hold 2 cards in hand instead of one. Negotiating a peaceful Iraq and a steady security in Lebanon, will raise Syria’s chances in returning to its goldmine.

7. What is the outcome of all this chaos?
The outcome of this really depends on how the U.S will handle the current situation. But with the various reports emerging and the obvious pacts and under the table deals happening, it is undeniable that the current government is staying in power. And it is irrefutable evidence that U.S interests lie parallel to Lebanese ones. Unfortunately this can change at any moment depending on how the internal Lebanese crisis will be dealt with.

8. Where is March 8th (Especially Michel Aoun) going wrong?
The first and most important wrong move made by the General was the pact signed with Hezbollah almost a year ago. This deepened the divisions within the Christians. The July war pointed out to the Lebanese how big of a mistake that pact was. In fact the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah broke 6 major points addressed in the pact which include but aren’t limited to the following:
· Transparency, openness, and placing the interests of the nation above any other interest, through the reliance on self-driven will, and a free and committed Lebanese decision-making.
· Limit the influence of political money and sectarian fanaticisms.
· Protecting Lebanon from Israeli threats through a national dialogue leading to the formulation of a national defense strategy over which the Lebanese agree to and subscribe to by assuming its burdens and benefiting from its outcomes.
Another important mistake that March 8th is doing is asking for illogical demands.
In fact, no democratic government in the world can be paralyzed because of the opposition’s held seats in it. In fact this defies the very purpose of a democracy.
The last and most relevant mistake to the current crisis is their position concerning the international tribunal. In fact if they were clear from the very beginning, it would have proven to the Lebanese that they have nothing to hide. However Hezbollah kept on postponing their response and got their ministers to resign from the government blaming it on its position towards the tribunal

9. Where is March 14th going wrong?
The most prominent mistake March 14th made is not foreseeing what Michel Aoun’s isolation might lead to. In fact, they should have given him whatever number of parliamentary seats he was asking for during the elections.


10. What should WE (the Lebanese youths) do?
The most important, and clever move one might do right now, is completely detaching himself from any political affiliation, and putting the country’s best interest at first.
Stop being victims of both propagandas and start putting your brain to work.
You are educated for a reason and that is not to blindly follow your leaders.
Put your curiosity to work, and try figuring out why Hezbollah has been shady about the international tribunal.
It’s called tunnel vision. And you are all victims of it.
Israel is not trying to poison the Lebanese by sending toxic balloons!
Hezbollah started being a terrorist organization and stopped being a resistance the moment they signed off on the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers.
Stop being ignorant and start engaging in constructive discussions and not destructive ones.
Try and understand each other’s concern and meet on middle ground.
Stop blaming each other for the billions of dollars in debt; they are not worth all that bloodshed.
ALL CURRENT LEADERS ARE CORRUPT INCLUDING MICHEL AOUN.

Simple Analysis of Today's Events.

I've been asked a few times now by my American friends to give meaning to today's events. So here is an attempt to my first political analysis:

First I will be defining all key terms in this particular situation. Whether it's a state or a non-state actor, whether it's the meaning of a particular village, city or region, and most importantly who was the target of today's atrocious acts.

Ayn Alaq: Town where on February 13­th 2007 was hit by two terrorist attacks on two different buses. Ayn Alaq is located about 20 Km northeast of Beirut (Lebanese Capital) and is just under the town of Bekfaya. Bteghrine is a village that lies on top of both these small towns. All three towns are linked by the same highway.

Bekfaya: Hometown of the Gemayel family. Pierre Gemayel is the founder of the Kataeb Party. Bashir Gemayel (Son of Pierre Gemayel) is a former Lebanese President that got assassinated by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party 9 days before he was due to take office. Amine Gemayel (Brother of Bashir Gemayel) is a former Lebanese President and is the current President of the Kataeb party. Pierre Gemayel (Son of Pierre Gemayel) was the victim of the latest wave of political assassinations that hit the Lebanese Scene. In other words the Gemayel family has offered all of its blood for the independence of Lebanon.

Bteghrine: Hometown of the Murr family. Michel Murr is a Lebanese business tycoon. However, what is more important to note is that he dominated the political scene as the Minister of Interior for almost a decade and was a close ally to the Syrians (early 90's to early 2000) he is also a close ally to Michel Aoun. Elias Murr (Son of Michel Murr and Son in Law of the current Lebanese President) is the current Minister of Defense; he was the victim of an assassination attempt in 2005 and escaped miraculously. Elias Murr issued a press statement earlier this month after confiscating a Truck Load of weapons Heading to Hezbollah and refusing to hand it back. It is important to note that Michel Murr and Elias Murr are in two different political currents opposed to each other. However they remain on pristine terms with each other.

Tuesday February 13th 2007:

Two buses explode in the Town of Ayn Alaq, Killing 3 people and wounding more than two dozen. Mass Hysteria takes over the Lebanese scene. People throughout the country are confused and enraged considering that the attacks came on the eve of the anniversary of the Rafiq Hariri assassination. The locations of the terrorist attacks were meticulously chosen. They send multiple warning messages to various leaders and most importantly to all the Christian community.

I - Location of the attacks:

1-Having read the few paragraphs in the beginning of this post, one cannot but question why Ayn Alaq?
Ayn Alaq is located in the "Metn" region of Lebanon. This region is known to be the second Christian stronghold (Keserouan being the first) in Lebanon. However this region is politically mixed. Thus one might see inhabitants supporting Michel Aoun & Michel Murr or supporting the Gemayels. Therefore what is most important to note in this situation, is that the attack deliberately targeted civilians. This form of attack unfortunately will be the first of many to come, unless an accord is reached between both parties.
The only winner in this case would definitely be a non-state actor following Syrian (State) orders. This points to the SSNP which have a long history of terrorism in Lebanon. In fact, the only winner in this case is Syria. Syria has been seeking to destabilize Lebanon since it was forced to pull out of the country. By destabilizing the country, the Syrians prove to the international community in general and the Lebanese community especially that whenever the Syrians occupied Lebanon, security was not an issue and bombs never went off.

2-Ayn Alaq is the town below Bekfaya. If you have been following the news lately, you might understand why they are targeting Bekfaya. Former president Amin Gemayel was visiting high ranked officials in the U.S government this past week, including Pres. George W. Bush. This kind of meeting happens very rarely unless a major change is on the horizon. I recall the last meeting between Bush and Gemayel, occurred whenever the latter was asked by the former to mediate between the US and Iraq. Therefore this meeting is in no doubt drawing presidential aspects for Amin Gemayel. Unfortunately this presents a major problem for General M. Aoun and his allies, considering that General M. Aoun has presidential ambitions and that Hezbollah and the Gemayels were rarely on good terms. However I will be giving the opposition the benefit of the doubt, and rule out the possibility of them carrying out such an attack, for the simple reason that this would be political suicide and Michel Aoun cannot afford to lose any Christian support he has left.

3-Ayn Alaq's proximity to Bteghrine:
This past week, Elias Murr, The current minister of defense has ordered the capture of a Hezbollah truck filled with a mixture of light and mid-range weaponry. Hezbollah, after having admitted the truck was actually theirs, bluntly asks the government to return it. However as one might expect, the minister of defense, diplomatically and publicly let Hezbollah know that if the weapons were in fact intended to be used against any Israeli aggression, they would lie better within the hands of the army, leaving Hezbollah cornered without anything to say. Therefore one might wonder that Hezbollah might be sending Elias Murr a reminder, reminding him of the last attempt on his life. Telling him that we got you once, doesn’t mean we can’t get you again.

II - Timing of the attacks.

1-Eve of the second Commemoration of Rafiq Hariri.
The 14th of February 2007 was intended to show the opposition that the government has its own share of supporters. But more importantly this date was supposed to be a peaceful one; therefore the attack carries a major warning to the Lebanese community as a whole. What is important to note is that both sides were calling for peaceful demonstrations on that date however both were aware that an unfortunate even was going to occur BEFORE the ceremony.

Conclusion:
The only actor that would be benefiting from a destabilization in Lebanon is Syria. In fact the Syrian regime has been supporting all insurgencies in Iraq for one single reason. They are sending the Americans a message. And here it is: “We will leave Iraq alone, if you hand us back Lebanon”

So I ask all Lebanese, and especially my Christian comrades regardless of their political affiliations: Do you want to return to the Syrian Stone Age? Do you want to return to the days where you were kept from demonstrating on the streets? Do you miss those midnight kidnappings? Do you miss that water hose that was directed at you during peaceful demonstrations? Do you miss the Syrian Intelligence services following you? Do you miss the July war? Do you seek Lebanon’s termination?
If you do I feel sorry for you. However if you don’t I ask you, in fact, I even beg you to stand out from the crowd, and head downtown today. Not to support the government, far from it, but instead to celebrate life. Celebrate Beirut’s Beauty, Beirut’s Spring, Beirut’s Sunshine, Beirut’s Nightlife and Beirut’s Freedom.

Reality Check for the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM)

(Click on the pic to witness the fpm's manipulated truth)

Below you will find a response for all of the FPM members that emailed me back.
Oddly enough 8 out of 10 had the same reply, as if they were told what to write
(or didn't know what else to write about)

First of all i'm sorry for the late response, i'm in the middle of my exams and haven't had much free time lately.

As much as i wish i could write a long email, and discuss politics with you, i can't so i will get straight to the point.

If you re-read my e-mail, you will see that i never said anything about arms or militia men, in fact the fpm is in a very critical position to use this as an argument considering their political allies, and the documented events that took place lately. If http://www.tayyar.org/ found a video that they posted online, i could copy and paste 100 links directly from http://www.youtube.com/ that will show you the direct opposite.

But again i am not here to argue i am just here to transmit a small message.

Since i first transferred to the states, i have been double majoring in Biology and Political-science and i can tell you from my own experience supported by actual political theories in books that "whatever" policy Aoun is taking will only lead to failure. In fact, all recent events support what i am saying. However, knowing you, you will never believe what i have to say. So i will rephrase my first email in a way that i make sure that you won't interpret it falsely.

1. If Aoun was in fact aware about the photoshoped image, he will face a huge credibility problem and will lose the last few christians he has around him. (yes i did say few even though you think that the majority of christians are with him, i hate to burst your bubble but actually very few are) and please don't give me the lecture that he represents the lebanese and not necessarily the christians because aside from the shiite popularity he has gained due to his alliance he would find himself alone)



2. If Aoun was Unaware of the photoshopped image, i start wondering what else is he unaware of? is he unaware of the 4 billion $ in losses after his political ally decided to kidnap the israeli soldiers? is he unaware of the christian Unity that he destroyed back in the 90's? is he unaware of the christian unity that he is destroying now? is he unaware that the biggest Contributor to his movement which i will keep anonymous has stopped funding him? is he unaware of the promises he once made to get the syrian accountability act signed by congress?
   
   

All i am asking of you is to try and document the events by yourself. This is how you will be able to start Working politics instead of Following politics.

I really hope we could have a more interactive conversation where we could actually exchange constructive ideas lively.

To Lebanon With Love (More Time To Bomb)